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Abstract: My aim in this article is to introduce readers to the topic of exploratory 
experimentation and briefly explain how the three articles that follow, by Richard 
Burian, Kevin Elliott, and Maureen O’Malley advance our understanding of the 
nature and significance of exploratory research. I suggest that the distinction 
between exploratory and theory-driven experimentation is multidimensional and 
that some of the dimensions are continuums. I point out that exploratory 
experiments are typically theory-informed even if they are not theory-driven. I 
also distinguish between research programs and experiments. Research programs 
that are largely exploratory, such as the ones discussed in these case studies, can 
involve both exploratory and theory-driven experimentation.  
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 This article introduces the topic of exploratory experimentation and briefly 
explains how the three articles that follow, by Richard Burian, Kevin Elliott, and 
Maureen O’Malley advance our understanding of the nature and significance of 
exploratory research1.  
 Recent philosophical research on exploratory experimentation began with the 
observation that experimentation in science is not always guided by theory, that 
sometimes, experimentation is exploratory in nature. Friedrich Steinle (1997) set 
out to characterize exploratory experimentation by examining a difference 
between specific experiments in the early research of electromagnetism. Some 
experiments were designed to look for specific effects, which were expected 
because of theoretical ideas about electromagnetism. But other experiments were 
set up to discover rules about electromagnetic behavior about which the 
investigators had no theoretical ideas, and hence had no specific expectations. 
This difference, as Steinle showed, was reflected in experimental designs. The 
                                                
1 Kevin Elliott organized a session on exploratory experimentation at the 2007 conference of the 
International Society for the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology and invited Dick 
Burian and Maureen O’Malley to give papers. He asked me to introduce the session and comment 
on the papers afterwards. The session turned out to be very stimulating and Kevin, Dick, and 
Maureen decided to develop their papers and submit them to this journal. I would like to thank 
them for inviting me to write and submit an accompanying essay, and for writing provocative 
papers on a topic that is central to my research on genetics and allied sciences. My thinking has 
been advanced by this collaboration. In addition, we all benefited from stimulating discussion with 
the audience at the conference and from our sustained conversations about their papers. I would 
like to thank Kevin, Dick, and Maureen for commenting on an earlier draft of this essay, and my 
colleague Antigone Nounou for suggesting the term “theory-informed”. I would also like to 
acknowledge Keith Benson’s patient support of this project. 
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exploratory experiments were set up in ways that enabled investigators to 
intervene in a variety of ways. This made sense because investigators did not enter 
the inquiry with ideas about which kinds of interventions were likely to influence 
the phenomena and how they would influence the phenomena. In contrast, 
experiments directed by theory were set up in ways that restricted the ranges of 
intervention. This enabled experimenters to focus on the most promising 
interventions, that is, most promising from the perspective of their theoretical 
ideas about the phenomena being investigated.   
 Richard Burian (1997) made similar observations, but in the context of early 
research on the localization and function of nucleic acids. Burian, who was 
influenced by Hans Rheinberger’s account of research on protein synthesis 
(1997), also used the term “exploratory experimentation” to describe a style of 
inquiry that is not guided by theory. Burian examined the extensive and fruitful 
research program of Jean Brachet, who investigated the distribution of nucleic 
acids through cell cycles and ontological development. Brachet’s inquiry was not 
guided by theoretical speculations about the role nucleic acids might play in these 
processes or even hunches about how nucleic acids would be distributed. Unlike 
Francis Crick, Brachet’s team did not employ theoretical speculation to guide 
their inquiry. They employed biochemical methods to systematically follow the 
distributions of these molecules through cell cycles and ontology in a variety of 
organisms. These experiments, Burian observed, were exploratory in nature. 
 There were differences between Steinle’s and Burian’s accounts. For example, 
Steinle proposed a narrower conception of “exploratory experimentation” than 
did Burian. But both philosophers argued that exploratory experimentation is an 
important activity in scientific investigation, an activity which has been obscured 
by traditional accounts of experimentation that stress the role of hypothesis 
testing, and by traditional accounts of scientific knowledge and practice that 
emphasize theoretical knowledge and theory-driven practice. Philosophy of 
science, as Ian Hacking (1983) complained, is theory-biased. Burian and Steinle 
both sought to understand the nature and role of a kind of experimentation, 
exploratory experimentation, that had been hidden by philosophers’ 
preoccupation with theoretical reasoning.  
 In thinking about exploratory experimentation and the articles that follow, it 
is helpful to keep three points in mind. First, the line between exploratory and 
theory-driven experimentation, as Steinle mentions, should not be drawn between 
experiments aimed at testing hypotheses and experiments aimed at generating 
new hypotheses. Theoretical considerations can direct experimentation in a 
variety of ways. Second, exploratory experimentation is typically not free of 
theory. There is a subtle but importance difference between being theory-directed 
and being theory-informed. The distinction between exploratory and theory-
driven experiments centers not on whether an experiment depends on theory, but 
on the way(s) in which it depends on theory. And third, the distinction between 
exploratory and theory-driven experimentation is not necessarily sharp. I will 
develop these points by briefly reviewing Thomas Kuhn’s account of “normal 
science” (Kuhn 1970).   
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Kuhn’s account of normal science, which Hacking (1983) criticized for being 
theory-biased, shows that theory-driven research encompasses much more than 
hypothesis testing. Although Kuhn articulated his account of normal science in 
terms of “paradigms”, his account centered on the idea that the practice of 
normal science involved articulating and extending “paradigm theories”. Kuhn’s 
classification of the activities of normal science included two umbrella categories: 
theoretical activities and “fact-gathering” activities. His description of theoretical 
activities is not directly relevant to my present concerns, and I will not discuss it 
here. His broad characterization of the fact-gathering activities included both 
experimentation and observation. But his taxonomy of fact-gathering activities 
did not divide along these lines, or along a line between hypothesis testing and 
exploratory research.  
Kuhn identified three classes of fact-gathering activities, each associated with an 
aim. The first class of activities identified by Kuhn are those aimed at uncovering 
facts about those things, such as periods of planets, specific gravities, spectral 
intensities, and boiling points that “the paradigm has shown to be particularly 
revealing of the nature of things.” (Kuhn 1970, p. 25)  These activities are theory-
directed in at least a weak sense, and in varying degrees in a stronger sense as well. 
They are theory-directed in the weak sense that the theory directed experimenters to 
search for facts about some things and not about other things. Experiments 
falling under Kuhn’s first class of fact-gathering activities can also be theory-directed 
in the strong sense that a theory generates expectations about what will be observed 
when the experiment is conducted. The second class of fact-gathering activities 
identified by Kuhn are aimed towards determining facts that can be compared to 
predictions from the paradigm theory. These are theory-directed, and in the 
strong sense that a theory generates expectations about what will be observed.  
The aim of the third class of activities, which Kuhn claimed are the most 
important fact-gathering activities of normal science, is to “articulate the paradigm 
theory”. (Kuhn, p. 27) Scientists do so by determining physical constants to 
greater degrees of accuracy (theory-directed in the strong sense), by revealing facts 
that can be used to select among alternative ways of extending the paradigm to 
closely related areas of inquiry (hypothesis testing), and by discovering new 
quantitative laws. The latter kind of activity might sound like “exploratory” rather 
than “theory-driven” experimentation. But here is how Kuhn described it: 
Perhaps it is not apparent that a paradigm is prerequisite to the discovery of laws 
like these. We often hear that they are found by examining measurements 
undertaken for their own sake and without theoretical commitment. But history 
offers no support for so excessively Baconian a method. Boyle’s experiments were 
not conceivable (and if conceived would have received another interpretation or none 
at all) until air was recognized as an elastic fluid to which all the elaborate 
concepts of hydrostatics could be applied. Coulomb’s success depended upon his 
constructing special apparatus …. But that design, in turn, depended upon the 
previous recognition that every particle of electric fluid acts upon every other at a 
distance. (Kuhn, p. 28) 
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Boyle’s experimentation seems theory-directed in at least the weak sense that the 
theory about the underlying phenomena led scientists to conduct the 
experimentation, but it is unclear whether it was theory-directed in the strong 
sense (i.e. it is unclear whether from the quotation whether Boyle’s theoretical 
ideas about hydrostatics generated expectations about what would be observed). 
The fact that Coulomb employed theory to construct an experimental apparatus, 
in itself, does not imply that experimentation utilizing the apparatus was theory-
directed, even in the weak sense. If a scientist employs a theory about one kind of 
phenomenon to experiment on a separate kind of phenomenon, the 
experimentation on that separate kind of phenomenon is not necessarily directed 
by a theory about that separate kind of phenomenon. If it is not directed by such 
a theory, it would be more accurate to call the experiment theory-informed rather 
than theory-directed. But Kuhn, himself, did not explore this nuance, and did not 
entertain the possibility that exploratory research was a part of normal science. As 
he put it, “No part of the aim of normal science is to call forth new sorts of 
phenomena; indeed those what will not fit the box are often not seen at all.” 
(Kuhn 1970, p. 24), 
My aim here is not to argue that Kuhn was mistaken to dismiss the possibility that 
exploratory experimentation is an important part of normal science. This is amply 
accomplished in the articles that follow. I discuss Kuhn’s account of normal 
science because it demonstrates the point that theory can drive research in a 
variety of ways. The style(s) of experimentation identified by Steinle and Burian, 
and investigated further by the articles that follow, falls largely outside the classes 
of experimentation and observation that Kuhn identified with the practice of 
normal science.2   
 The second point to keep in mind is that exploratory experimentation is not 
(typically) theory free. All kinds of background theories are used to set up 
experiments, generate data, and draw conclusions (as Kuhn’s remark about 
Coulomb’s apparatus attests). Exploratory experimentation is embedded within 
scientific inquiry that relies on a lot of theory. The point of difference, Burian 
(1997) and Steinle (1997) suggest, is that the experiments are not “directed” by 
the aim to test, develop, or otherwise articulate an existing theory or hypothesis. 
Roughly speaking, the aim of exploratory experiments is to generate significant findings about 
phenomena without appealing to a theory about these phenomena for the purpose of focusing 
experimental attention on a limited range of possible findings. The findings might be 
significant with respect to a variety of goals ranging from the practical goal to 
learn how to manipulate a phenomenon to the theoretical goal to develop a 
conceptual framework that will help focus future experimental attention.  
                                                
2 This raises a question of whether exploratory experimentation is what Kuhn meant by pre-
paradigm science. The quick answer is no. Kuhn’s account of pre-paradigm practice attributes 
a large role to theoretical speculation. The distinction between normal and pre-paradigm 
science in Kuhn’s account centers on whether science is driven by a single paradigm 
associated with a uniform theoretical perspective or whether it is practiced in a disunified 
fashion associated with a number of conflicting theoretical perspectives. Experimentation in 
pre-paradigm science, according to Kuhn’s account, is often theory-driven. 
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As Burian says in this issue, exploratory experimentation comes into play when 
theory does not provide expectations of what investigators will find. He does not 
deny that theory plays a role in exploratory experimentation. Instead, he claims 
that theoretically generated expectations do not direct research by guiding 
scientists to set up particular experiments. The vagueness of “direct” and “guide” 
in this context leads to the third point: the distinction between exploratory and 
theory-driven experimentation does not mark a sharp division. The fact that 
theory plays a multiplicity of roles in theory-driven research indicates that the 
difference between exploratory experimentation and theory-directed 
experimentation may involve multiple dimensions. And the fact that some of 
these roles admit degrees indicates that the difference between exploratory and 
theory-driven experimentation might represent continuums along these 
dimensions. Clearly, thinking about experimentation in terms of a simple 
dichotomy is too superficial.  
In addition to these three points, it is also helpful to keep in mind the distinction 
between experiments and programs of research. Some research programs, such as 
the program of investigative research in genetics, involve stable meta-strategies of 
exploratory experimentation in which the experimental procedures themselves 
evolve over time (see Waters 2008). Appreciating the significance and continuity 
of experimentation, as the example of genetics shows, requires understanding the 
larger context of the research program in which they are carried out. And in the 
larger context, one and the same research program might include a combination 
of both exploratory and theory-driven experimentation. Some research programs 
are largely exploratory in nature, such as the ones discussed in the three articles 
that follow. And others are largely theory-directed, such as the ones that are 
emphasized in traditional philosophical discussions. But research programs that 
are largely exploratory might include some theory-directed experiments and 
programs that are largely theory-driven might include some exploratory 
experiments. Adding to the complexity is that fact that one and the same 
experimental procedure might be employed for the purposes of exploratory 
research in some situations and theory-driven research in others. The messy world 
of scientific practice may not yield to sharp distinctions aimed at partitioning 
research programs or experimental procedures into neat categories such as 
theory-driven versus exploratory.  
In light of these sloppy complications, philosophers might be tempted to drop 
the topic of exploratory experimentation altogether. Perhaps this style of 
experimentation is relevant only in the very early contexts of scientific 
investigation. One might suppose that the progressive development of scientific 
practice depends on experimentation becoming increasingly directed by theory. If 
this were the case, then understanding the productivity of scientific practice 
would require understanding the ways in which experimentation becomes 
increasingly effective as it becomes increasingly theory-driven. One might argue 
that the exploratory experiments discussed by Steinle and Burian are outliers, not 
worthy of philosophical attention or analysis because the experimenters did not 
use the kind of reasoning that makes scientific experimentation so productive. 
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The reasoning that makes scientific experimentation so productive, on this view, 
is reasoning that employs theoretical considerations in ways that focus 
experimental attention on a limited range of possible findings. This seems to be 
Kuhn’s explanation of the productivity of normal science. 
Burian’s contribution to this issue offers a new and compelling argument against 
the idea that exploratory experimentation is an outlier. Or to put it more 
positively, Burian offers good reason to think that the continued success of 
biological sciences will depend on the use of exploratory experimentation that will 
not be led by theory-generated expectations. His argument is based on ontology. 
He claims that biological systems, such as the system of a cell, are too 
complicated to be investigated by means of a theory-driven approach. Such 
systems contain a variety of mechanisms that work in such different ways that no 
single theoretical perspective can unify the details of their workings. Hence, 
knowledge of the details of some mechanisms in a system will not provide general 
insights that will help direct experimentation on other mechanisms in the system. 
Burian bases this claim on the way scientific investigation has proceeded in the 
study of microRNA, on recent discoveries about the mind-boggling complexities 
of molecular mechanisms in cellular biology, and on biologists’ understanding of 
the highly contingent nature of the evolutionary process.  
If Burian is correct, then exploratory research in biology is here to stay. The 
future success of experimental inquiry will depend on it. This motivates the 
project of investigating the styles of reasoning underlying exploratory 
investigations. And this is exactly what Elliott and O’Malley do in their 
contributions to this volume. Their case studies move our understanding of 
exploratory experimentation beyond simplistic dichotomies and call attention to 
nuances and complexities of exploratory experimentation in the broader context 
of exploratory research. Elliott’s aim is to develop a taxonomy of exploratory 
experimentation by conducting a case study of nanotoxicology, a program of 
ongoing research rich in exploratory experimentation. The aim of nanotoxicology 
is to determine the biological and environmental effects of nanoparticles. Elliott 
analyzes a comprehensive plan of investigation for the field written by a leading 
investigator, Gunter Oberdörster and his collaborators (2005).  
Elliott’s analysis leads him to construct a taxonomy of exploratory 
experimentation which is strikingly different than Kuhn’s taxonomy of the 
research activities of normal science. Nevertheless, there is overlap in the 
activities that Kuhn and Elliott identify. Kuhn, for example, includes the 
construction of experimental apparatus (e.g. Coulomb’s device) as does Elliott. 
And Elliott includes the aim of resolving anomalies, as does Kuhn. This suggests 
that the difference between exploratory and theory-driven research practices is 
more subtle than a simple dichotomy. Elliott deals with the complexity of 
exploratory experimentation by constructing a taxonomy along three separate 
dimensions:  (1) different goals, (2) different ways theory is employed, and (3) 
different experimental methods and strategies. One feature his taxonomy 
exemplifies is the lack of sharp distinctions among different styles of exploratory 
experimentation. He describes the differences in terms of continuums.  
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Careful readers will notice that Elliott’s taxonomy includes classes of 
experimentation that seem to be theory-directed. For example, his dimension of 
different aims includes anomaly resolution, which appears theory-directed in at 
least the weak sense that theory directs experimenters to seek information about 
some things and not other things. His dimension of the different roles that theory 
can play in experimentation includes the role of being used as a starting point. 
This seems to cover theory-directed experimentation in the strong sense that 
theory generates expectations of what will be observed. Each of Elliott’s 
categories is exemplified by an experimental strand in nanotoxicology. What the 
presence of these categories of apparently theory-directed experimentation 
indicates, I suggest, is that the research program of nanotoxicology, while largely 
exploratory, includes some theory-directed experimentation. One way to interpret 
Elliott’s taxonomy, though not the way he originally intended, is as a taxonomy of 
experimentation in an exploratory research program. Under this reinterpretation, his 
taxonomy reveals that an exploratory program of research can include both 
exploratory and theory-driven experimentation. In addition, it shows that the 
difference between exploratory and theory-directed experimentation, as the 
difference between styles of exploratory experimentation, involves gradations of 
differences along multiple dimensions. 
O’Malley, in her article that follows, explicitly examines the way exploratory and 
theory-driven experimentation interact within the context of an exploratory 
program of research. She examines metagenomics, a program of research that 
involves the sequencing and analysis of large amounts of DNA collected across a 
variety of specific environments containing a diversity of microorganisms. The 
aim of this “high through-put” research is to explore currently uncharacterized 
microbial entities and processes. Metagenomics has led to a number of important 
discoveries and O’Malley focuses on several strands of investigation that began 
with the accidental discovery of a proteorhodopsin gene in ocean microbes. 
Proteorhodopsin is associated with processes that produce energy from light (but 
not via the more complex processes of photosynthesis that involve chlorophyll). 
Prior to this discovery, scientists thought this kind of energy producing process 
was extremely rare and confined to microbes in highly unusual environments. The 
discovery, as O’Malley shows, led to a number of important discoveries ranging 
from concrete conclusions about the prevalence of light utilization in ocean 
waters to the abstract idea that functional properties ought to be studied as they 
relate to particular environments rather than to particular lineages of organisms. 
She also shows how this discovery led to new ideas about the dynamics of gene 
transfer and microbial evolution.  
O’Malley’s account shows that the research program of metagenomics involved 
exploratory experiments that were theoretically informed, but not theory-driven. 
But her account also shows that various strands of research led to theory-driven 
analysis of data (that led, for example, to conclusions about the selection of very 
small sequence changes) and the testing of theoretical ideas (that led, for instance, 
to the rejection of ideas about the evolution of rhodopsin molecules). She points 
out that the testing of theoretical ideas in the context of metagenomics sometimes 
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fits the model of natural experimentation (which examines naturally existing 
patterns of variable combinations instead of patterns resulting from experimental 
manipulation). She calls this special kind of probing natural history 
experimentation. O’Malley concludes that the practice of metagenomics involves 
an interaction of a diversity of activities including exploratory experimentation, 
theory-driven experimentation, and natural history experimentation. 
The picture of scientific practice that emerges from Burian’s, Elliott’s, and 
O’Malley’s cases studies shifts attention to styles of experimentation that are 
obscured by the theory-biased perspective that currently dominates the 
philosophy of science. Burian offers a strong argument for the idea that 
exploratory experimentation is and will continue to be an essential part of 
experimental practice in biological sciences. It is not a fleeting feature of the early 
stages of scientific investigation. Elliott offers a taxonomy that helps make sense 
of the complexity of largely exploratory research programs without obscuring the 
important role of exploratory experimentation. His taxonomy offers an important 
starting point for organizing our understanding of scientific research practices 
that are not dominated by theory. O’Malley helps pave the way towards 
understanding how scientific research can involve a productive interchange of 
different styles of experimentation and observation. Together, these articles 
provide a strong corrective and should, I hope, lead all of us to adopt a less 
theory-biased, more inclusive, investigation of scientific practice. 
References 
Burian R., 1997, ‘Exploratory Experimentation and the Role of Histochemical 
Techniques in the Work of Jean Brachet, 1938–1952’, History and Philosophy of the Life 
Sciences, 19: 27–45. 
Burian, R., 2007, ‘On microRNA and the Need for Exploratory Experimentation in Post-
Genomic Molecular Biology’, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 29(3): 
Elliott, K., 2007, ‘Varieties of Exploratory Experimentation in Nanotoxicology’, History 
and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 29(3): 
Hacking, I. 1983. Representing and Intervening, Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. 
Kuhn T., 1970, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Oberdörster G., et al., 2005, ‘Principles for Characterizing the Potential Human Health 
Effects from Exposure to Nanomaterials: Elements of a Screening Strategy’, Particle 
and Fibre Toxicology, 2: 8. 
O’Malley, 2007, ‘Exploratory experimentation and scientific practice: Metagenomics and 
the proteorhodopsin case’, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 29(3): 
Rheinberger H.-J., 1997, Toward a History of Epistemic Things: Synthesizing Proteins in the Test 
Tube, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Steinle, F. 1997, ‘Entering New Fields: Exploratory Uses of Experimentation’, Philosophy 
of Science (Proceedings), 64: S65–S74. 
Waters, C. K., 2008, ‘Beyond Theoretical Reduction and Layer-cake Antireduction: How 
DNA Retooled Genetics and Transformed Biological Practice’ in Michael Ruse and 
David Hull (eds.) Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Biology, pp. 238–262. 
